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In Defense of Messianic Judaism

March 15, 2018 by Jason Petersen Leave a Comment

Last updated 6/25/2018

Introduction

Recently, I have announced that I have moved from Presbyterianism to being a Messanic believer. I have been accused of being a heretic, legalist, and being above correction (despite my admitting that I was wrong about my Presbyterianism and changing my position in accordance). Thankfully, many of the responses have been level headed, even if they did not agree with what I had to say. Before I begin my defense of my change in theology, I’d like to make a few things clear:

1. I still hold that we are are justified by faith alone.

2.  I still hold that there is one God that exists as God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit.

3. I am still Clarkian in my apologetic methodology.

4. I still view Christians that attend churches as my brothers and sisters in Christ.

There are a couple of things that I will point out in this article as well:

1. Those who stand in opposition against me cannot apply their hermeneutical method consistently throughout scripture.

2. Those who have harshly come out against me do not understand my position.

I also want to say that I bear no animosity toward those who have risen up against me. Given what we are taught about views that state that we should continue to follow the Torah to the best of our ability, their reaction to my announcement is understandable. Most of them have been gracious (I will say that Dr. Talbot of Whitefield was gracious despite me being kicked out of seminary). I never held such a negative view of the Messanic Judaist movement, but I also knew that I had a lot of reformed brothers and sisters in Christ that did not look upon those views favorably. It is often worth mentioning that I was not allowed to continue my studies at Whitefield Theological Seminary due to my new Messanic beliefs.

In this article, I will lay out my hermeneutical method (which is demonstrably valid through scripture), I will give a positive case for my new position, and I will address some of the criticisms that I’ve received. I have been convicted that this is the right view of the Covenants and God’s law, and I have put my money where my mouth is because this change in my theology resulted in me being kicked out of seminary.

There is a pretty good debate on this issue, and a lot of the issues covered in this debate are also covered in this article. I’d recommend watching it if you want to hear interaction between someone who thinks we should be observing Old Testament Laws and someone who thinks we shouldn’t be. There is also a good debate on the Sabbath. I’d recommend watching it as well.

My Method of Interpretation

The most critical issue that caused me to change my views was my learning of a method of interpretation that Yeshua, the Prophets, and the Apostles all used throughout scripture. I will be applying the method of interpretation that is known as ‘PaRDeS.’ There are four levels of interpretation for scripture, and it can be applied throughout scripture without the addition of situational (and arbitrary) hermeneutical principles. Here are the four levels of interpretation, their meaning, and verses in the Bible where these levels have been applied. What I will give concerning these interpretations are from the notes I took while I was studying Messianic Judaism:

P (P’shat) means ‘plain or ‘simple.’

-P’shat is plain in its meaning. It’s a literal or plan reading of the text. In Hebrew, it means to ‘strip off.’

-Daniel 9:2 (which I think references Jeremiah 29:10) is an example of this principle

-Psalm 17:8 is another example of this principle. “shadow of thy wing” refers to shelter. This shows that ‘P’shat’ does not always denote a literal meaning of the text. It also takes literary devices into account.

R (Remez) means ‘hints’ or ‘inference.’

-In Hebrew, the literal meaning of ‘Remez’ is ‘wink.’

-Remez is used when there is a hint of a meaning beyond P’shat.

-An example where using Remez is appropriate is Genesis 3:21. “ADONAI Elohim made Adam and his wife tunics of skin and He clothed them. “ Although it is not directly stated in the passage, it is implied that an animal was killed. This would be the first instance of death that is recorded in the scriptures (although it was revealed implicitly). This fact is drawn out via inference. In this case, this would be drawn out via a simple modus ponens inference. I think it is likely that many instances of Remez would look something like this:

(P) If God made a tunic of skin, (Q) an animal was slain.

(P) God made a tunic of skin.

(Therefore, Q) Therefore, an animal was slain.

This type of inference is justifiable to use because the inference is found in the Bible. For instance, modus ponens is used by the Apostle Paul in Romans 5:8-10. Verse 8 and 9a contain the antecedent (P). Verse 9b contains the consequent (Q). Verse 10 argues for the soundness of the premises.

-Exodus 21:23-25, “If any harm follows, you are to penalize life for life, eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, blow for blow.” Though it is not explicitly stated in this passage, it is clear that God is indicating that the punishment must fit the crime. This is also made clear by preceding verses that denotes a less severe punishment if no harm follows from the assault.

-Typological interpretation also falls under this level of interpretation.

D (Derash) means ‘inquire’or ‘search’ (this is the same thing as ‘Midrash’). It can also mean ‘devotional.’

-The literal meaning of DeRash is to ‘search out.’

-‘Derash’ is used to find a meaning in the text that is applicable to our own lives.

-It is a form of eisegesis. It is permissible to use as long as it does not disort the simple meaning of the text.

-Galatians 4:21-26, “ Tell me, you who want to be under Torah, don’t you understand the Torah? For it is written that Abraham had two sons, one by the slave woman and one by the free woman. But one—the son by the slave woman—was born naturally; while the other—the son by the free woman—was through the promise.Now these things are being treated allegorically, for these are two covenants. One is from Mount Sinai, giving birth to slavery—this is Hagar. But this Hagar is Mount Sinai in Arabia and corresponds to the present Jerusalem, for she is in slavery along with her children. But the Jerusalem above is free—she is our mother.” The Apostle Paul was speaking of Genesis 17. In Galatians 4, the Apostle Paul is telling the reader how Genesis 17 relates to them.
-It is my opinion that this principle can be easily abused; however, given that this method is used in the Bible, it is indeed Biblical. Some say that this principle is eisegesis, but if Paul used it to explain a passage while being lead by the Holy Spirit, asserting that this principle is eiegesis is equivalent to calling the Holy Spirit a liar.

S (Sod) means ‘secret’ or ‘mystery’. The literal meaning of the word is ‘secret.’

-Proverbs 25:2, “It is the glory of God to conceal a matter and the glory of kings to search it out.” This is understood to mean that God has hidden secrets in scripture.

-Revelation “Here is wisdom: let the one who has understanding calculate the number of the beast, for it is a number of a man, and his number is 666.” This passage is considered to have a secret meaning.

-Romans 11:25 “For I do not want you, brothers and sisters, to be ignorant of this mystery—lest you be wise in your own eyes—that a partial hardening has come upon Israel until the fullness of the Gentiles has come in;” This passage confirms that God has hidden some things from us.

These secrets will either be answered at an appointed time or they may never be answered. This is not a principle that always allows you to ‘find’ the answer to secrets. It’s an acknowledgement that God keeps secrets that we either do not yet understand or will never understand. Those secrets that we find the answers to are no longer secrets. While we can use this principle to decipher some truth that may otherwise be a secret, we are not always able to do so.

It is important to note that any deeper meaning cannot contradict the simple (P’shat) meaning of the text, and one cannot spiritualize a verse in order to move up to the next level of interpretation.

If anyone wishes to challenge my views, I expect them to lay out their method of interpretation and justify that method with scripture as I have. Otherwise, their theology will be distorted and will not be able to withstand criticism. Once I learned this method and adopted it, my views on the Bible rapidly started to change. As someone who is a systematic thinker, I was quickly able to identify the deficiencies in my own theology and understand the proper view that should replace it.

My Case for Why Christians Should Follow the Torah

There is no dispute among Christians that the Jews and believing Gentiles had to keep the Torah in the Old Testament, therefore, most of my arguments will be from the New Testament.

In Matthew 5:17-20, Yeshua said, “Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to fulfill them. For truly, I say to you, until heaven and earth pass away, not an iota, not a dot, will pass from the Law until all is accomplished. Therefore whoever relaxes one of the least of these commandments and teaches others to do the same will be called least in the kingdom of heaven, but whoever does them and teaches them will be called great in the kingdom of heaven. For I tell you, unless your righteousness exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven.”

Some terminology must be clarified in order for us to understand what Messiah Yeshua was saying here. The Greek term for ‘kataluó’ means to overthrow. The Greek word for ‘fulfill’ means to complete. Many people say, “Well, this means that Jesus came to complete the law so we don’t have to follow it anymore.” I understand why someone might think this as I have thought this since I was raised in church. There is, however, a distinction that the Bible makes between ‘abolish’ and ‘fulfillment.’ Therefore, it is clear that they are not equivalent in meaning. What would it look like if the laws were overridden in comparison to them being fulfilled?  If we took the typical interpretation that Protestants and Catholics use, the distinction would be quite murky.

There is another pertinent phrase in this passage to clarify. What does it mean when Yeshua says, ‘until all is fulfilled?’ This is another point of disagreement. The Greek that is used for ‘will pass away’ means to void. So, the law will only become void at a certain point in time. Now, we must ask, what is this point in time? When Yeshua says, “until the heavens pass away,” in the Greek, this phrase also means to make void. The heavens were not made void when Yeshua died on the cross and rose again. Therefore, the Bible is not teaching that the Old Testament laws should not be followed once Yeshua died and rose again; rather, it is speaking of the passing of the old creation and the coming into being of the new creation. It is also worth noting that Yeshua says that we should not relax the laws of the Torah, and that those who relax the law and teaches others to do the same will be called least in the kingdom of heaven. Such statements would not make sense if the law was about to be done away with. Most Christians will argue that all will pass away when all has been fulfilled. I agree, but there are things that have yet to be fulfilled such as Yeshua’s second coming.

Revelation 21:4 reads, “He shall wipe away every tear from their eyes, and death shall be no more. Nor shall there be mourning or crying or pain any longer, for the former things have passed away.” In Revelation 21, the passing away of heaven and earth is equated with the end of pain and suffering. As long as these things exist, we are still under the Torah.

Furthermore, Messiah Yeshua, and the Apostles (even after Yeshua’s atonement for our sins) observed the Torah. In Acts 24, the Apostle Paul defended himself against the notion that he was not keeping the laws of the Torah. In Acts 21, the Apostle Paul made a sacrifice in the temple. In Matthew 28, before he ascended to heaven, Yeshua told his disciples to go and teach everything that he had commanded of them. This would include his affirmation for observing the Torah. In Acts 2, the Apostles were still celebrating Pentecost. In Acts 10, Peter declares that he has never eaten unclean meat. This shows that the Apostle Peter was keeping the Torah’s dietary laws even after Messiah Yeshua atoned for our sins. In Acts 13, 17, and 18 we see repeated instances of the Apostles keeping the Sabbath. In Acts 20:16, the Apostle Paul was afraid he wouldn’t get back to Jerusalem in time to observe Pentecost.  In 1 Peter 1:16, the Apostle Peter appeals to the Torah as his authority to tell us to be Holy (Leviticus 11:44-45). In Leviticus 11, the Hebrew word for ‘holy’ includes keeping the Torah. In 1 Corinthians 5:6-8, the Apostle Paul explains how to keep Passover (this showcases the continued importance of the feasts even in the New Testament).

I can give many more examples, but this should suffice as a summary. If anyone attempts to argue against my interpretations, I will go into more depth. Nevertheless, Yeshua’s words in Matthew 5 and Revelation 21’s equivalence of heaven and earth passing away to the ending of pain and suffering is already enough to prove my point. The other examples are icing on the cake.

Responding to Objections to Following the Laws of the Torah

There are several objections that the Church will normally give against the observance of the Torah. In this section, I will respond to these objections.

Acts 10 and Dietary Laws

The Church (though most academics will not) will typically argue that the vision that Peter had in Acts 10 shows that we can now eat meat that was previously considered unclean. Let’s look at the passage in question and examine the claim:

“The next day, as the soldiers were traveling and approaching the city, Peter went up to the rooftop to pray, at about the sixth hour. Now he became very hungry and wanted to eat; but while they were preparing something, he fell into a trance. He saw the heavens opened, and something like a great sheet coming down, lowered by its four corners to the earth. In it were all sorts of four-footed animals and reptiles and birds of the air. A voice came to him, “Get up, Peter. Kill and eat.” But Peter said, “Certainly not, Lord! For never have I eaten anything unholy or unclean.” Again a voice came to him, a second time: “What God has made clean, you must not consider unholy.” This happened three times, and the sheet was immediately taken up to heaven. Now while Peter was puzzling about what the vision he had seen might mean, behold, the men sent by Cornelius found Simon’s house and appeared before the gate.”

Now, there are a few things that I would like to point out. First, Peter, an Apostle who walked with Yeshua himself, affirmed that he has kept the dietary laws of the Torah even after Yeshua’s death. Clearly, Yeshua did not teach him that he would no longer have to follow the Torah’s dietary laws. Someone may argue that such an inference is a stretch; however, let’s suppose for argument’s sake that Yeshua told Peter that he could eat what was formerly considered unclean once Yeshua died on the cross. Why would Peter be puzzled about the vision and adamantly refuse to eat unclean meat? There is only one possibility. Yeshua left Peter with the impression that he was to continue observing the Torah’s dietary laws.

Furthermore, the Apostle Peter tells us the meaning of his dream in Acts 10:28, “He said to them, “You yourselves know that it is not permitted for a Jewish man to associate with a non-Jew or to visit him. Yet God has shown me that I should call no one unholy or unclean.” The meaning of Peter’s dream was to not call gentiles unholy or unclean. The unclean animals were symbolic of Gentiles, and the phrase, “kill and eat,” referred to the proclamation that Gentiles are clean. It is also worth noting that the law that Peter referred to about Jewish men not being able to associate with Gentiles is found nowhere in the Torah; rather, it was an oral man-made tradition. Now, someone might wonder why the vision happened three times. The reason why it happened three times is because there were three Gentiles that were coming to visit him. This is yet another indication that the vision in Acts 10 had nothing to do with dietary laws.

Anticipating Objections for Acts 10

If the objector insists on arguing that Peter’s vision in Acts 10 means that we are now permitted to eat what was “previously considered unclean,” the objector will typically go to other passages to support that conclusion. This amounts to an error in hermeneutics. What Biblical hermeneutical principle would allow you to read into a vision such as Peter’s by appealing to passages that are external to that vision? The only interpretation we have of the symbolism that God used in Peter’s dream is found in Acts 10:28, and what other man would be aware of the meaning of Peter’s vision besides Peter himself? One could say that Yeshua would know, but there were not any words spoken from Yeshua that foreshadows Peter’s dream.

While Christians may concede that the dream was about Gentiles not being unclean, some will argue that there is an additional meaning to the dream and that meaning is that we are now permitted to eat whatever meat we want. And what context in Acts 10 would allow such an inference? You cannot infer (remez) a proposition from scripture that causes a verse to lose it’s simple (p’shat) meaning. We must take care to not interpret visions outside of the vision itself and what is directly said about the vision. Doing so will cause us to interpret the vision out of context because the simple meaning would be lost. When a Christian tries to make Acts 10 about dietary laws, the passage in question loses its ‘simple’ meaning.

Galatians 5:18, Romans 6:14, and Not Being Under the Law

Galatians 5:18 reads, “But if you are led by the Spirit, you are not under the law” and Romans 6:14 reads, “For sin shall not be master over you, for you are not under law but under grace.” This is often used by those in the Church to teach that we no longer have to follow the laws given to us in the Torah.  The phrase, ‘under the law,’ does not refer to obedience to the law. It refers to the penalty of the law.[ref] The errant interpretation of these passages by the Church is simply a matter of linguistics.[ref]

Anticipating Objections for Galatians 5:18 and Romans 6:14

This issue is a matter of linguistics so any objection to these interpretations would also be a matter of linguistics. While I do have some familiarity with Greek, I will not pretend to be an expert. I will only say that if the reader has any doubts about my claims to look at the reference that I cited for more information.

Colossians 2:16-17

Colossians 2:16-17 reads, “Therefore, do not let anyone pass judgment on you in matters of food or drink, or in respect to a festival or new moon or Shabbat. These are a foreshadowing of things to come, but the reality is Messiah.” The Church often points to this passage to show us that we now do not have to observe the festivals, dietary laws, or in some cases the Sabbath. There is nothing in Colossians that suggests that the Apostle Paul was speaking to believers that were no longer observing the law of the Torah. Indeed, it is quite the opposite. Colossians 2:8 reads, “See that no one takes you captive through philosophy and empty deception, according to the tradition of men and the basic principles of the world rather than Messiah.” Are the festivals, dietary laws, and the Sabbath traditions of men? No. These things were instituted by God.  Furthermore, Colossians 2:20 reads, “If you died with Messiah to the basic principles of the world, why—as though living in the world—do you subject yourselves to their rules?” The distinction being made is between following Christ and following the world.

Anticipating Objections for Colossians 2:16-17

It is hard to anticipate any objection to this passage because the egregious error of the common interpretation of this passage is obvious. I will add that the only thing that the Apostle Paul said was cancelled by Yeshua in Colossians 2 is our record of debt (verse 14). In fact, the Greek word used for ‘record’ is ‘cheirographon,’ and this term means erasing a legal document.

Romans 10:4

Romans 10:4 reads, “For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to everyone who believes.” Unfortunately, the translation by many English Bibles is probably one of the reasons why this verse is so commonly misunderstood. Some versions, such as the TLV says ‘goal’ instead of ‘end.’ ‘Goal’ is the least ambiguous word for this verse. The verse should state that Christ is the goal, and not the end. The Greek word, ‘telos’ denotes a purpose or a means, it does not refer to ‘end’ in the sense that the law will cease.

Anticipating Objections to Romans 10:4

Some may insist on arguing (it is hard to anticipate how because the hermeneutic that is used to draw the Church’s conclusions from this scriptures is arbitrary) that Yeshua caused the law to cease. In multiple passages such as Colossians 2, the Apostle Paul talks about how Yeshua fulfilled the penalty of God’s law. If Yeshua fulfilled the penalty, that can only mean that the law was not done away with. Indeed, arguing that the law has ceased due to Yeshua’s atonement would necessarily lead to universalism (although most Christians would not be inclined to accept this heretical view).

Galatians 2:14

Galatians 2:14 reads, “But when I saw that they were not walking in line with the truth of the Good News, I said to Peter in front of everyone, “If you—being a Jew—live like the Gentiles and not like the Jews, how can you force the Gentiles to live like Jews?” In this passage, it is assumed that Peter was living like a Gentile in the sense that he wasn’t observing the laws of the Torah. Given Peter’s remarks about him never eating unclean meat in Acts 10, an interpretation such as the one that the Church typically attributes to Galatians 2 would result in a contradiction in scripture. Furthermore, the issue the Apostle Paul is addressing is revealed in Galatians 2:11-13, “But when Peter came to Antioch, I opposed him to his face, because he was clearly in the wrong— for before certain people came from Jacob, he regularly ate with the Gentiles; but when they came, he began to withdraw and separate himself, fearing those from the circumcision. And the rest of the Jews joined him in hypocrisy, so that even Barnabas was carried away with their hypocrisy.”

In essence, Galatians 1:6-9 tells us why the Apostle Paul wrote Galatians. It reads, “I am astonished that you are so quickly deserting the one who called you to live in the grace of Christ and are turning to a different gospel— which is really no gospel at all. Evidently some people are throwing you into confusion and are trying to pervert the gospel of Christ. But even if we or an angel from heaven should preach a gospel other than the one we preached to you, let them be under God’s curse! As we have already said, so now I say again: If anybody is preaching to you a gospel other than what you accepted, let them be under God’s curse!” The controversy is not about keeping the laws of the Torah. It is about the true Gospel. Paul and Barnabas came to Jerusalem to discuss this matter. What was the false Gospel being preached? Acts 15:1 chronicles this particular trip to Jerusalem, ” Now some men coming down from Judea were teaching the brothers, “Unless you are circumcised according to the custom of Moses, you cannot be saved.”

The events in Galatians 2 occur after it is decided that we are justified by faith alone. Galatians 2 has nothing at all to do with the laws of the Torah. As it was pointed out in Galatians 1 and Acts 15, the issue was over the true Gospel. While many interpret Galatians 2:14 to mean that we are no longer obligated to follow the Torah, verse 15 shows this interpretation to be faulty, “We are Jews by birth and not sinners from among the Gentiles.” Paul is telling Peter that he cannot expect the Gentiles to live like him if he is in sin. More confirmation of this context is given as the passage goes on, verse 16 reads, “So even we have put our trust in Messiah Yeshua, in order that we might be set right based on trust in Messiah and not by deeds based on Torah—because no human will be justified by deeds based on Torah.” This verse further shows that the big controversy in Galatians was about justification, not about whether or not we should follow the Torah. After all, even the Old Testament never presented the laws of the Torah as a means to salvation. Indeed, Job wrote in Job 19:25, “I  know that my redeemer lives, and that in the end he will stand on the earth.” Given that the Torah was never a means to salvation even in the Old Testament, the typical interpretation that is given by those who say we are no longer obligated to follow the laws of the Torah doesn’t make any sense.

Arguments Against a Saturday Sabbath

This section will cover the objections to God’s clear mandate to observe the Sabbath on Saturdays.

Hebrews 8:8-13

This objection does not use a verse that mentions the Sabbath directly, rather, it infers that something about the observance of the Sabbath (whether they are arguing that it has been done away with because Jesus is our rest or whether they are arguing that the Sabbath is now on Sunday and is known as the ‘Lord’s Day’) has changed. So, the conclusion that we no longer have to observe the Sabbath on Saturday is inferred by the objector rather than being claimed to be stated explicitly in scripture.

Hebrews 8:8-13 reads, “For he finds fault with them when he says: “Behold, the days are coming, declares the Lord, when I will establish a new covenant with the house of Israel and with the house of Judah, not like the covenant that I made with their fathers on the day when I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt. For they did not continue in my covenant, and so I showed no concern for them, declares the Lord. For this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, declares the Lord: I will put my laws into their minds,and write them on their hearts,and I will be their God,and they shall be my people. And they shall not teach, each one his neighbor and each one his brother, saying, ‘Know the Lord,’ for they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest. For I will be merciful toward their iniquities, and I will remember their sins no more.” In speaking of a new covenant, he makes the first one obsolete. And what is becoming obsolete and growing old is ready to vanish away.”

Unfortunately, the argument employed by the Church is nothing more than a blanket assertion that involves a lot of question begging. Having been a seminary student for quite a long time, I understand why even some of the most astute pastors, theologians, and philosophers that are in the church do not see what they are doing. Sometimes, we are conditioned to make assumptions without even realizing it. I am not saying the Church does this on purpose, of course. I am only pointing out that this is what I think is happening.

This objection is of little substance because the argument hinges on merely assuming what is involved with the coming of the New Covenant. As was previously stated, the Sabbath is not specifically mentioned in Hebrews 8:8-13. Although this does not mean that the Church is necessarily wrong with their interpretation of this passage, it should at least give us reason to pause so that we can carefully think through the logic of the objection.

Hebrews 8:8-12 is a reference to Jeremiah 31:31-34. Jeremiah 31:31-34 reads, “Behold, the days are coming, declares the Lord, when I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and the house of Judah, not like the covenant that I made with their fathers on the day when I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt, my covenant that they broke, though I was their husband, declares the Lord. For this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, declares the Lord: I will put my law within them, and I will write it on their hearts. And I will be their God, and they shall be my people. And no longer shall each one teach his neighbor and each his brother, saying, ‘Know the Lord,’ for they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest, declares the Lord. For I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more.” Since Hebrews 8:8-13 is discussing what the prophet Jeremiah said in Jeremiah 31:31-34 it would be prudent for us to understand the author of Hebrews in light of this passage. Notice that Jeremiah only gives two implications of the New Covenant that he prophesied. First, God’s law would be written on our hearts. Second, God will offer us permanent forgiveness of sins through Yeshua, who is our high priest that sits at the right hand of God. There is nothing that the Prophet Jeremiah said that even suggests that the Laws of the Torah will be abolished. One would think that this would raise a red flag for anyone who comes across the Church’s erroneous interpretation of Hebrews 8:8-13.

There is more to this issue than I have discussed, however. Discussion of the issue involves being fluent in Greek and Hebrew. While I do have some familiarity with Greek, I will not pretend that I am an expert in it. In fact, the issues involved with the Greek in this passage are currently beyond my own expertise. Some of the discussion about the Greek also involves interacting with the Hebrew language (I do not know Hebrew, although recently started learning how to write Hebrew letters) so I am not able to discuss it in sufficient detail.  For further information on these issues, I recommend looking at this article.

Answering Other Objections to Following the Torah in the New Covenant

Some may argue that there are consequences of my beliefs that may be uncomfortable in an emotional sense. There are also objections that are miscellaneous. There are three that I have heard thus far, but I am sure that there will be more.

1 John 3:4 and 3:9-10

In this objection, the objector argues that those who violate the Sabbath are in unrepentant sin, and therefore, are false converts if the Saturday Sabbath condition is true. This objection overlooks the grace that we have due to Messiah Yeshua’s sacrifice for our sins. All of us sin or transgress God’s law daily, yet we all believe we have grace through faith in Yeshua (Romans 5:8-11). Why would it be any different for the Sabbath? Besides, the majority of Christians are not observing the Sabbath because they are taught the false ideas of either the Sabbath being on Sunday or the observance of the Sabbath being nullified through Yeshua. Those who believe in Yeshua, but violate the Sabbath will be in the kingdom of heaven as long as they believe that Yeshua died on the cross for our sins and rose again (Romans 10:9). It should be also worth noting that there are other passages like 1 Corinthians 6:9-10 says, “Or do you not know that the unrighteous will not inherit the kingdom of God? Do not be deceived: neither the sexually immoral, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor men who practice homosexuality,nor thieves, nor the greedy, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor swindlers will inherit the kingdom of God.” Does this mean that people who lie, steal, or have improper sexual relations will go to hell even if they believe in Yeshua? No! If we were to interpret 1 John 3 as the objector had, we would have no hope for salvation! Clearly, 1 Corinthians 6:9-10 and 1 John 3: 4, 9-10 are all assuming that those who are in sin do not have salvation through faith in Yeshua.

The Holy Spirit

In objection to my position, someone once told me, “You just have to follow the Holy Spirit.” The Holy Spirit will never tell you anything that is contrary to the revelation given to us through the Bible. This person also argued that I need to stop changing my mind. This is contrary to God’s command for us to be accepting of correction (Proverbs 19:20).

It’s Just Weird

When someone tells me that the observance of the Old Testament Laws that God himself has given to us is weird, you have to wonder if they are evaluating scripture according to their own standards instead of God’s standard. If someone says that what I am doing is weird, I simply don’t care. Anyone who would even dare to call the commandments of God ‘weird’ should make sure that they are truly submitting themselves to God. The Laws we observe should be based on the Bible, not personal preference.

You Are Putting Yourself Under the Law

No, I’m not. We are justified through faith alone. The law has never been a means unto salvation. Usually, the person will quote Galatians 5:4,  “You who are trying to be justified by Torah have been cut off from Messiah; you have fallen away from grace.” Since I am not seeking justification through the law, I am not cut off from Messiah. 

The Veil has Been Torn in the Completed Work of Christ

See this article.

Conclusion

This is why I have come to my current theological position and how I would respond to the objections to my position that I heard so far. I have been struggling with the Covenants on and off since 2014. There was actually one time where I almost changed my theology in a way that would align me with Messianic Judaism (I think that was in 2015). After looking at dispensationalism, covenant theology, and new covenant theology, I settled on Presbyterian covenant theology. I started to doubt that position when a friend of mine mentioned Romans 6:14. When I started thinking about the relationship between the law and the Gospel, it caused me to doubt my position.

I took another look at the Bible. I also had a friend recommend books to me. One of which was ‘Abraham’s Four Seeds (It’s a good read if you want to get an understanding of New Covenant Theology)’. In the end, I found the New Covenant Theology view more satisfying than either dispensationalism or covenant theology, but the largest issue I had was the lack of Bible verses that tell us that the Laws of the Torah were abolished, and the view involves spiritualizing passages that should not be spiritualized, and this causes the simple meaning of the text they are dealing with to be lost. For this reason, and the other reasons I shared in this article, I have adopted Messianic Judaism.

This change of theology was very costly for me. I lost a lot of friends (I’m not talking about acquaintances; I am talking about friends), and I was kicked out of Whitefield Theological Seminary even though my beliefs still aligned with their statement of faith. I would still recommend Whitefield as a seminary due to its academic rigor, but I was very disappointed in the way they handled this issue. Their students’ behavior toward me was also way out of line. I was not given the opportunity to defend my position before the President of the seminary or the Board of Directors. I was offered the chance to talk to one of their professors after they had already kicked me out, but by then, in my mind, it was too late (I was willing to correspond in writing, this offer was declined). Obviously, this was a big decision and I knew it would be costly. I would not have made this change in theology if I did not think that the position was faithful to the scriptures.

In case you are wondering about the Old Testament laws, most of them cannot currently be followed because there is no temple in Jerusalem that meets the specifications given in the Old Testament, there is not a theocracy (including a sanhedrin) in Israel, and the laws in question would only be in effect in Israel. It was actually the destruction of the temple in Jerusalem, not Yeshua’s death and resurrection that caused many of the Old Testament Laws to not be followed. If the temple were properly rebuilt, the observance of these laws would start up again. It is also worth noting that even many theologians in the church would agree that animal sacrifice would happen during the millennium.

I hope that this article will help you understand where I am coming from regardless of whether or not you agree with me.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Footnotes:

1. For a more in depth explanation, you can read this article.

2. This is also applicable to other passages that speak of not being ‘under the law’ such as 1 Cor. 9:20.

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Filed Under: Addressing Critics, Articles, Defending the Faith, Uncategorized Tagged With: Apologetics, Messianic Judiaism, Old Testament Laws

My Thoughts on my Debate/Discussion With Eric Hernandez

December 18, 2017 by Jason Petersen Leave a Comment

 

On December 15th, Eric Hernandez and I appeared on Joe Wyrostek’s, “What Do You Believe?” Podcast. I really enjoyed having a discussion with Eric, and I found him to be of good temperament throughout the entire debate. It is uncommon for a classicalist and a Clarkian apologist to engage in such a format, and I think that everyone watching got a good idea of what such a dialogue would look like.

I thought Eric asked some pretty interesting questions. He questioned me on whether or not that the proposition, “I’m baking a cake,” is an opinion. He threw me for a loop was when he asked, “Do you know that it’s an opinion?” I had to give some pause because it is a question that I never pondered. I thought this was the toughest question he asked in the entire debate, and I found Eric to be more formidable than any other person that I have engaged, and I do think there were some areas that I could have done better in, but I would think that everyone who has ever been in a debate is familiar with that feeling.

What I thought was telling and really highlighted the insufficiency of Eric’s apologetic methodology was when he used the Prophets of Baal and Elijah as an example. Elijah proposed that the he and the prophets of Baal would set up an offering. Eric said that Elijah used evidence to show that God was real when God rained fire down on the sacrifice. I then asked him to picture himself as a Prophet of Baal, and I asked him how a Prophet of Baal would have known that this fire was from the Christian God if Elijah hadn’t told him about it. Eric admitted that he wouldn’t have been able to know. I think this was the moment that the deficiency of trying to demonstrate God apart from the Bible was the most evident.

There were other issues as well that I think were problematic such as the problem of induction (which Eric never gave a solution for), and his insistence on inferring propositions from a non-propositional source such as sensory data. He also failed to give a definition of logic; he instead deferred to the laws of logic as their definition, but that is not a definition; the laws of logic are just examples of logic. I defined logic as the science of necessary inference, but Eric did not seem to like that definition, and that lead the discussion to two people who were talking past each other. We never quite got to hear how a classical apologist would arrive at the conclusion of the Christian God, but I suspect that Eric was not interested in having a discussion about epistemology.

Of course, I believe that I had the upper hand throughout the discussion, but I have no doubt that he believes that he had the upper hand. As Joe pointed out towards the end of the discussion, it was as if Eric and I had different rules on how to do philosophy. From the discussion, this was readily apparent.

I think that this discussion was good for both sides. It is rare that people get a chance to hear the Clarkian viewpoint, and though I found Eric’s answers to my objections to be inadequate, I think it was clear that Eric had answers because he probably had already given these issues some thought. He views his answers as sufficient, but I don’t view his answers as sufficient. This is just the product of disagreement.

I made a point throughout the discussion that Christians have a lot of options when it comes to apologetics. Indeed, Christianity is under attack from all sides. Because of this, I don’t want Christians to feel like they have to do apologetics my way. I don’t expect everyone to be an expert in epistemology. God has given us all different aptitudes in different areas. Some excel in science, others in philosophy, and some may be interested in history and textual criticism. It’s good to have Christians that have different approaches to defending the faith and who specialize in different areas. My apologetic methodology would appeal to someone who is concerned about epistemology. Eric’s apologetic methodology would appeal to someone who is concerned about evidence. I suppose that I hold an unpopular opinion amongst my Clarkian brethren when I say this, but classical apologetics does have its place in church history, and as inadequate as it may be, it is clear that God has still used classical apologetics for his glory. After all, Wiliam Lane Craig, a classical apologist, was a big factor in me getting to where I am today in my spiritual walk.

Overall, I enjoyed the discussion and I think that it will be beneficial to a lot of people. There will be people who state who they believe won the debate, but in the end, Eric, Joe, and I are ultimately on the same side.

 

Filed Under: Addressing Critics, Articles, Uncategorized Tagged With: Classical Apologetics, Debates

Accounting for Logic-A Response to Alex Malpass

December 3, 2017 by Jason Petersen Leave a Comment

 

Introduction

A while back, I debated Dr. Alex Malpass on the latter half of Bible Thumping Wingnut Show. In the debate, it was clear that Malpass had no understanding of Clark’s philosophy and he had admitted he never read Gordon Clark’s writings. Even after admitting that he never read Clark, Malpass wrote a commentary on the debate.[ref] Even though he had not read Clark, he tried to talk about his philosophical system anyway. I responded to his commentary.  Academics are supposed to study a philosopher carefully before criticizing him, but I am guessing that Malpass doesn’t mind trying to take short cuts for the sake of coming off as an expert.

After some time had passed, Malpass wrote a piece that criticized Tim Shaughnessy’s article on accounting for logic (where Shaughnessy aligns his view with Dr. Gordon H. Clark). Even though Malpass’s piece does not address me directly, it does address my view of logic. Therefore, this blog post will be a response to Malpass’s blog post (or whatever he wants to call it).

Contrasting Clark and Van Til

Malpass:

For instance, here [His blog post, ‘The Problem with TAG’] I argue that there is no binary choice between Christianity and non-Christianity; there are different versions of Christianity, different monotheistic religions, different versions of theism, and different versions of atheism.[ref]

A quote from his cited blog post:

“This is the method [He is referring to Cornelius Van Til] of ‘internal critique’, where one assumes the interlocutor’s position to show that it leads to internal inconsistencies, as opposed to keeping one’s own assumptions fixed when analyzing the interlocutor’s position.

So two things need to be established:

  1. The Christian worldview can provide a non-self-contradictory account of human experience.
  2. The non-Christian worldview cannot provide a non-self-contradictory account of human experiences.

Talk of ‘the Christian worldview’ and ‘the non-Christian worldview’ is to be taken with a pinch of salt (although this will prove controversial later). Obviously, there are lots of different denominations of Christianity, including reformed Presbyterian, Lutheran, Catholic, Greek Orthodox, etc. Equally, there are many distinct non-Christian positions, including every denomination of every other religious worldview, plus every variation of atheist worldview, etc. If we take this plurality of worldviews into account, then the claim is that at least one Christian worldview can account for the intelligibility of human experience, and that none of the non-Christian worldviews can. This claim has not been demonstrate by presuppositionalists, and I will argue that we have reason to doubt that they can demonstrate this claim.”

Response:

Oy Vey! Where to begin? I’ll start by saying that Malpass has no idea what he is talking about. Van Til and Clark approach critiquing philosophical systems differently. Van Til argued from, as Dr. Greg Bahnsen would put it, ‘the impossibility of the contrary’ (although Van Til never formally articulated TAG in any of his writings or lectures because, as far has he was concerned, the Christian worldview must be true for syllogisms to work). In contrast, Clark tested other worldviews for logical consistency. Van Til didn’t believe it was possible for another worldview to be logically consistent, whereas Clark thought it might be possible, but also stated that he opined that worldviews that were based on false propositions would probably run into a problem at some point.

Clark never held that logical consistency demonstrates a claim. Therefore, the two points that Malpass says need to be established are not relevant to the Clarkian apologetic. Heck, Clark would argue that experience doesn’t demonstrate the truth of any proposition (If Malpass would actually take the time to read Clark, he’d be aware of that). It is obvious that Malpass isn’t familiar enough with Clark to be able to distinguish between those who use TAG and Clarkians.  If he doesn’t know the difference, he needs to read Clark before he criticizes him so that he can stop spreading misinformation. It looks like he still has not heeded my advice. If I were a student of his and were aware of him being so careless in criticizing other philosophies, I would be concerned about the quality of education that I would be receiving.

As for the definition of Christianity, Shaughnessy has told me that he defines it as the 1689 London Baptist Confession of Faith (Clark and I would define it as the Westminster Confession of Faith). ‘Christianity,’ like other words, can have multiple definitions. In the English language, it is not uncommon for a word to have at least four distinct definitions. Just because people define the word  ‘Christianity’ in different ways does not mean that Christians have a problem with the word when they defend the faith. The Christian can simply give the definition of Christianity that they are using. As long as the term is defined, there is no philosophical problem to be found with the term. Why would an atheist want to talk about what Lutherans believe if they are arguing with a Baptist? It is not relevant to the conversation at hand. If Shaughnessy and I have a discussion about our disagreement on how we should define Christianity, per both of our confessions of faith, we would have to go to the Bible to argue our cases. The same goes with any Christians that have disagreements (2 Timothy 3:16), but we are also taught to not focus on trivial matters that distract us from the Gospel (Titus 3:1-10). Fortunately, salvation does not require a perfect theology so those who hold to erroneous theology can still be saved as long as they believe Jesus Christ died for their sins and rose from the dead (which would result in turning away from their sin).

Now, what of Malpass’s assertion that the choice between the Christian and non christian worldview being non binary? In my case, I define Christianity as the Westminster Confession of Faith. Either you accept the confession or you don’t. In this case, the choice is clearly binary.

Alex Malpass:

“More specifically with regards to the broadly Clarkian idea of deriving logical principles from the Scriptures, I have argued here [he cites a blog post that addresses me] that this is incoherent. Derivation requires a logical framework, which is constituted in part by logical principles (or axioms); derivation is a logical notion, and thus presupposes logical principles.”

Response:

Malpass is correct to point out that deriving logical principles from scripture would involve the assumption of logical principles, but it is not problematic for Clark’s philosophy. It is one thing to assume a proposition, it is another to demonstrate it. Just as it is with mathematics, one must often possess a true proposition before they can demonstrate it. All truths must be possessed prior to being able to demonstrate them. Nevertheless, I have already responded to his accusation in an earlier blog post that Malpass has not yet bothered to address. He is only reasserting a line of argument that has already been debunked.

What is Logic?

Malpass:

“Shaughnessy’s view of logic seems to be entirely gained from the study of Clark, in that he is the only author cited (rather than, say, Aristotle or Frege) on the topic of what logic is. This is unfortunate, because it seems that  Shaughnessy is unaware of the controversy surrounding the topic.”

Response:

While it is important to be aware of “controversy,” controversy says nothing of whether or not Shaughnessy’s position on logic is true. Malpass might as well argue, “Shaughnessy’s view of the truth doesn’t take into account the controversy about truth.” The presence of a controversy doesn’t mean that it’s a problem for the position in question. If it were, no one could know anything (and it’s easy to see that notion is a self-defeating proposition).

Malpass:

So, we see him state that logic is “the correct process of reasoning which is based on universally fixed rules of thought”. This idea, that logic is about laws of thought, is a historically significant idea, coming to prominence in the 18th and 19th centuries, but it has never been a universal consensus among logicians and philosophers. These days it is not widely represented among practising logicians and philosophers at all (see this for a quick overview). The reason for this is that in the contemporary setting logic has a much broader extension, and can cover systems which deviate wildly from how we might realistically model thought (which is the preserve of logicians and computer scientists working in artificial intelligence).

Response:

If the presence of controversy surrounding logic were a problem for Shaughnessy’s position, why is Malpass referring to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy without question?  If the presence of controversy is a problem for Shaughnessy’s position, it is also a problem for everyone else’s position. It is very clear that Malpass is not being fair to Shaughnessy’s position.

Malpass:

Logic, thought of broadly as concerning valid inference for various types of argument forms, is not considered to be tied in any special manner to how we think. There may be a logic to how we think, but logic is not just how we think. Never-the-less, Shaughnessy makes no mention of this, and simply asserts that logic has this 18th century relation to cognition.

Response:

Malpass is confusing the definition of logic with the ontology of logic (in this case, the discussion of how logic relates to a person’s mind). The definition of logic that Shaughnessy provided says absolutely nothing about the human mind. His definition only references necessary inference. The definition given by Shaughnessy does not require that people always think according to the laws of logic. The truth of a proposition is not demonstrated by people’s adherence to it.

Now, if we take a look at the ontology of logic, the reason why these rules of thought are fixed is because these rules are the structure of God’s mind. Because God is omniscient, he knows all true propositions. Because God has revealed in the scriptures that the laws of logic are true, God has always known them to be true. Because God has always known them to be true, logic has always been true. Because logic has always been true, the rules of thought that are expressed in logic are universal and fixed. 

If one looks at Shaughnessy’s definition, necessary inference is a part of his definition. Shaughnessy is not claiming that people always think logically, nor does Gordon Clark. We have all heard the adage, “rules are meant to be broken.” Perhaps Malpass is working towards being Exhibit A.

Malpass:

His out-of-date description of logic becomes confounded with outright misunderstandings when he spells out what he considers to be the three laws of thought.

Response:

And here Malpass proceeds to ‘step in it’ on the basis of his careless representation of Shaughnessy.

Malpass:

It is utterly standard, when going down this non-modern view, to list the three laws of thought as: ‘the law of identity’, ‘the law of non-contradiction’ and ‘the law of excluded middle’. What is odd is the way these are cashed out by Shaughnessy. For instance, the law of non-contradiction is cashed out as “A is not non-A”, and the law of excluded middle is cashed out as “A is either B or non-B”. It seems to me that there is a failure of Shaughnessy to distinguish clearly between different aspects of vocabulary. There is a fundamental difference between logical vocabulary that refers to things directly (like ‘Alex’, ‘London’, ‘your favourite type of ice cream’, etc) and those which express facts (‘Alex is in London’, ‘vanilla is your favourite type of ice cream’, etc). The first are called ‘terms’, and the latter are called ‘propositions’. Propositions can be thought of as made up of terms standing in certain relations to one another. Crucially, propositions are given truth-values, true or false; terms are not.

Response:

After saying that Shaughnessy’s definition of logic (a term, if you will) is outdated and false, Malpass goes on to say that terms (and by necessary extension, their definitions) cannot be true or false. If this is the case (and it is), why whine about Shaughnessy’s use of the word ‘logic?’

Furthermore, Shaughnessy does distinguish the the terms, ‘the law of identity’, ‘the law of non-contradiction,’ and ‘the law of excluded middle’ from propositions when he gives references a proposition for each term. One has to wonder if Malpass is even taking adequate time to assess Shaughnessy’s article.

Malpass:

In Shaughnessy’s expression of the law of non-contradiction, we have a letter ‘A’, which seems to be a term, as it is something we are predicating something to, but then the predicate we are ascribing to it is that it is “not non-A”. The problem is that we have a negation fixing to a term, ‘non-A’. As I have pointed out before, negation is a propositional operator, and its function is to switch the truth-value of the proposition is prefixes from true to false (or vice versa). If we prefix it to a referring term, like ‘A’, then (because terms don’t have truth values), the resultant operation is undefined.

Response:

I can definitively confirm that symbols such as ‘A’ in Shaughnessy’s description of logic represent propositions and not terms. Shaughnessy’s use of negation should have made that obvious to any person who is familiar with logic.

Malpass:

It is bizarre to say that either ‘A is B or non-B’. There is no predicate ‘non-B’; rather, either B applies or it doesn’t.

Me:

‘A is B or non-B’ refers to the law of excluded middle. Proposition B is a potential propositional statement about A. ‘Non-B’ represents the negation of proposition B. These are two definitive propositions in which there is no middle ground. Although the phraseology is not conventional (and who says it has to be as long as Shaughnessy defined his terms?), the propositional content is accurate. There is no problem with Shaughnessy’s description of the laws of logic.

Malpass:

So we have an out-of-date view of logic, coupled with a technically incorrect presentation of the principles under discussion. It’s not a great start to an article about the nature of logic.

Me:

So we have a logic professor that struggles to understand logical expressions, misrepresents his opponents, and can’t distinguish confuses a definition of a word and ontological issues that are relative to the word.  This is probably why no Clarkian has bothered to respond to Malpass up until now. He has made so many errors that the process of correction is tedious to the point of it being burdensome (I was hoping someone else would do it so I wouldn’t have to).

Logic in the Bible

Malpass:

Perhaps Shaughnessy’s misrepresentation of the basic laws of thought is more understandable when we see where he is going with all of this. The ultimate point he will be driving at is that these laws are found in the Bible. Various snippets of the Bible are then presented as evidence of this, but because they don’t really fit that well with the laws when expressed properly, he has written them in such a way that the claim that they are found in the Bible becomes (slightly) easier to swallow.

Response:

Logic is a propositional enterprise. As long as the propositions are correct, and the symbols within the proposition are defined, there is no issue with phraseology.

Malpass:

In the book of Timothy, it is said that God cannot contradict himself. I say that this is completely irrelevant to the principle of non-contradiction. There is a difference between saying things, and things being true (or false). The law of non-contradiction is about the latter, not the former. It isn’t a rule which says ‘thou shalt not contradict thy self’. It says that there is no proposition for which both it and its negation are true. It doesn’t proscribe what you can or cannot say at all.

Shaughnessy:

“The law of non-contradiction (A is not non–A) is an expression of the eternal character and nature of God, “for he cannot deny [contradict] himself” (2 Tim. 2:13). The law of identity (A is A) is expressed in God’s name, “I AM WHO I AM” (Exodus 3:14), and the law of the excluded middle (A is either B or non-B) is expressed in Christ’s own words, “He who is not with Me is against Me” (Luke 11:23).“

Malpass:

Let’s take these one at a time. It is hard to take them seriously, but I will try.

In the book of Timothy, it is said that God cannot contradict himself. I say that this is completely irrelevant to the principle of non-contradiction. There is a difference between saying things, and things being true (or false). The law of non-contradiction is about the latter, not the former. It isn’t a rule which says ‘thou shalt not contradict thy self’. It says that there is no proposition for which both it and its negation are true. It doesn’t proscribe what you can or cannot say at all.

Response:

Malpass claims that God not being able to contradict himself (as Shaughnessy pointed out using 2 Timothy 2:13) is not relevant to the principle of the law of contradiction. Pish posh. The law of contradiction cannot be true unless there are true and false propositions. Is the statement, “God cannot deny himself” not a statement that can be true or false? It’s a proposition so it necessarily must have a truth value.

What about Titus 1:2? “….In hope of eternal life, which God, who never lies, promised before the ages began.” This does not mean that God lies, it does not mean that God always lies, it means that God doesn’t lie. Therefore, anything that God reveals, when scripture concerning God’s nature is taken into consideration, is necessarily true. Malpass claims that 2 Timothy 2:13 isn’t a claim about a proposition being true, but when the entirety of what scripture says concerning God’s nature is taken into consideration, it is clear that 2 Timothy 2:13 is a declaration of truth.

Malpass:

For example, I can contradict myself, and sometimes do. Does this mean I broke the law of non-contradiction when I did so? No, of course not. Imagine I say ‘It is sunny now, at 14:07’, and then a few minutes later, ‘It was not sunny then, at 14:07’. The two sentences I uttered were expressing (from different times) that it was and was not sunny at 14:07. Obviously, it would be a contradiction if both of these were true, as p and not-p would both be true (exactly what the law of non-contradiction forbids). But were they both true? That would mean that it was both sunny and not sunny at the same time. Conventionally thinking, this is impossible. Therefore, while I contradicted myself, I didn’t break the law of non-contradiction. I expressed a true proposition, and then when I uttered the negation of that proposition what I said was false (or vice versa). Contradicting yourself isn’t a case of breaking the law of non-contradiction.

Response:

If Malpass had claimed that it was both sunny and not sunny at the same time, that would be a contradiction. It is possible for it to be both sunny and cloudy at 14:07 because time  passes between 14:07 and 14:08.  Even the two propositions in question make it clear that it was initially sunny and then at a later  time it was not sunny. Furthermore, logic isn’t temporal, but the content of propositions in a syllogism or an expression can express temporarality. In the case of Malpass’s example, the propositions he chose in his example clearly express temporality.

A contradiction, as Shaughnessy is currently using the term, is the expression of the truth of two propositions that are mutually exclusive. When Malpass criticizes Shaughnessy, he is taking a lot of liberty with the definition of ‘contradiction.’ This makes Malpass’s criticism of Shaughnessy beside the point. I would like to know what definition of ‘contradiction’ Malpass is using because the definition he is using is certainly foreign to any logic textbook that I’ve read.

Malpass:

Back to the Biblical example, God cannot contradict himself. So what? The law of non-contradiction is true even though people can contradict themselves. An example of a being, even an infinite one, who cannot contradict themselves, is not an example of the law of non-contradiction. To think that it is, is to mix up the idea of saying two contradictory things with two contradictory propositions both being true.

Response:

In the case of 2 Timothy 2:13, ‘ἀρνέομαι’ is the word that is used for ‘deny.’ This word means to contradict. This is where Shaughnessy got the law of contradiction from. Scripture’s statement concerning God never contradicting himself is a clear affirmation of the law of contradiction. Again, Malpass doesn’t give us his definition of ‘contradiction,’ but it is clearly not the one that Shaughnessy is using. This is not surprising considering I had to correct Malpass on the poor definition he gave for the word ‘logic’ in my debate with him. Any contradiction is a violation of the law of contradiction, and any statement that is not contradictory is in adherence with the law of contradiction. In this case, since God, who reveals himself to be consistent in multiple passages such as 2 Timothy 2:13, is the determiner of truth, the truth will never be contradictory. This means that the law of contradiction is universal according to scripture. While it is true that people contradict themselves (Malpass is a great example of this phenomenon), God does not contradict himself, and that is why the law of contradiction is universal despite people contradicting themselves. After all, the truth of a prescriptive proposition is not predicated on a person’s adherence to it.

Malpass:

Shaughnessy does manage to state the law of identity correctly, which is that (for all referring terms) A = A. Everything is identical to itself. According to the example given, the law of identity is expressed in “I am who I am”, which is the answer God gives to Moses in the book of Exodus. It has always baffled me as to why this has been seen as a profound thing for God to say here. God tells Moses to go to the Pharaoh and bring the Israelites out of Egypt. Moses basically says, ‘who am I to do that?’ God says that he will be with Moses, but Moses wants a bit more reassurance for some reason:

“Moses said to God, “Suppose I go to the Israelites and say to them, ‘The God of your fathers has sent me to you,’ and they ask me, ‘What is his name?’ Then what shall I tell them?”

God said to Moses, “I am who I am. This is what you are to say to the Israelites: ‘I am has sent me to you.’” (Exodus, 3: 13-14)”

One of my favourite comedy series ‘Knowing Me, Knowing You’, staring Steve Coogan, features a pathetic TV chat show host, called Alan Partridge. In episode 2, he is interviewing an agony aunt called Dannielle, played by Minnie Driver, who is listing the things she likes in men:

Dannielle: Power is attractive. Sensitivity. Sense of humour. I like a man who knows who he is.

Alan: I’m Alan Partridge.

If you think that the law of identity is expressed by Exodus 3:14, then you should also hold that it is expressed in this little bit of Alan Partridge script.

I’m just going to leave that there.

Response:

In epistemology, the way to escape skepticism (in this case, I define skepticism as the view that no proposition can be known to be true), is being able to discern truth from falsehood. In Clark’s philosophy and in reformed tradition, scripture is our guide in discerning true propositions from false ones. This is why the affirmation of the law of identity that is expressed in Exodus 3:14 is significant.

In the case of the comedy, Clarkians don’t view ‘Knowing Me and Knowing You’ as a show that could escape skepticism if it were somehow expressed in a systematic fashion. Therefore, Clarkians do not have to hold that a comedy demonstrates the law of contradiction. I can’t believe I just had to explain this.

Malpass:

In the last example, Jesus saying “He who is not with Me is against Me” is an example of someone expressing something stronger than the law of excluded middle. The logical law of excluded middle says that for every proposition, p, either it or its negation is true. There are two propositions being considered in the saying above, put together in the form of a disjunction. The two propositions are:

‘x is with Jesus’

‘x is against Jesus’

The combined disjunction is universal, in that it applies to everyone:

For all x: either x is with Jesus or x is against Jesus.

However, this isn’t a logical truth. There is no logical reason to stop someone being neither with nor against Jesus.

If Jesus had said ‘Either you are with me or not with me’, then he would have said something which would have been logically true (because of the law of excluded middle).

Therefore, when Jesus says that everyone is either with him or against him, something which goes beyond the law of excluded middle, and it is not a logical truth. Why this has been picked to be an instance of this law can only be put down to either the author not understanding what the law actually states, or being so determined to find something that fits the pattern that they wilfully ignore the fact that it doesn’t.

Response:

The former independent clause in Matthew 12:30 reads, “Whoever is not with me is against me,” is an affirmation of the law of the excluded middle because “if X is not with me, X is against me affirms,” that there is no middle ground in being with or against Jesus Christ. In order for the proposition in this verse to be true, the law of excluded middle must also be true. Since the truth of the proposition in question is predicated on this law, and because the propositions in scripture are the thoughts of God, it is only reasonable to conclude that scripture affirms this law, for if it is not true, Jesus would be a liar, and as we know, God cannot lie (Titus 1:2, Numbers 23:19).

Truthfully, I have never been a fan of the law of the excluded middle nor the law of identity. As far as I am concerned, they both can be reduced to the law of contradiction. Given that the law of contradiction is already a law of logic, the other two laws seem unnecessary to me. Nevertheless, the universality of this law of identity and the law of the excluded are affirmed because the universality of the law of contradiction is affirmed in verses such as 2 Timothy 2:13. The only way that the law of the excluded middle and the law of identity could not be universal is if the law of contradiction is not universal. The logical forms do not have to be explicitly stated in the Bible, we must only see an affirmation of logical forms in the Bible in order to confirm that they are valid. This is because we already have terms and definitions that we use to reference the laws of logic. As long as we are aware of what we are, we can recognize an inference or law of logic when a proposition in scripture is predicated on the truth of the inference or law in question.

Malpass:

Shaughnessy then presents the standard presuppositional line, the one we all knew was coming, where they brag about how great their ‘account’ of logic is, and how rubbish ‘the other account’ is.

“The unbeliever cannot account for logic in his own worldview and therefore cannot account for his ability to think rationally. The challenge has been made many times to unbelievers to account for logic in their own worldview and it has always fallen short or gone unanswered. Never has an adequate response been given. In formal debates, the challenge is often ignored by the unbeliever, yet the challenge demands an answer because debates presuppose logic. The unbeliever is required to use logic in order to make his argument against Christianity consistent and intelligible, but only the Christian worldview can account for logic. He is therefore required to rob the Christian worldview in order to make his argument against Christianity intelligible.”

Ok, well we’ve all seen this over and over again. So I am going to meet the challenge head on, and provide a few different ‘accounts’ of logic, which could be ‘epistemological foundations’ for it.

First of all, what do we mean by and ‘epistemological foundation’ for something? Well, I take it to mean something in virtue of which we can come to know something. So, an epistemological foundation for x could be thought of an an answer to the question, ‘how is it that we are able to know about x?’

Given that, our question is: ‘How is it that we are able to know about logic (and in particular those logical laws)?’. In order to play the game right, I shall not appeal to God in any way, I will just go along with the idea that logical laws are things that have some kind of ontology capable of allowing reference to them, and I will just pretend that the three principles cited by Shaughnessy (identity, non-contradiction and excluded middle) really are ‘logical laws’, even though it is a clumsy and out-dated way to talk about logic. I will play the game anyway, just to be a good sport.

Response:

Before Malpass even gets started, I am already seeing problems. What does it mean to Malpass to “know” something? He has given no definition of knowledge, and I don’t know what the ‘something’ that allows us to know ‘something’ is. I guess we will soon find out.

Malpass:

Here is the first way of answering that question: we are able to know about logical laws because they are self-evident truths. This just means that to think about them is to know that they are true. They don’t need anything else to support my knowledge of them, because they are self-evident. This is a really simple answer, and there isn’t much more to be said about it.

Response:

This is not a good account for the laws of logic. As Malpass pointed out earlier in his blog post, these laws are frequently violated, and since a person thinking about a proposition does not make the proposition that is being thought about true, just thinking about a law of logic doesn’t make it true. The way to avoid skepticism is to distinguish true propositions from false ones.

If two people have a disagreement on a subject matter, this means that there are propositions that both of them believe that are in contradiction with one another. Does this make both of the propositions true despite the truth of the law of contradiction? If both propositions are true, the law of contradiction is false. If the law of contradiction is true, his account for the laws of logic fails.

Malpass:

Here is my second proposal: we are able to know about logical laws because they are synthetic a priori truths. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant summarises his views on this type of knowledge as follows:

“…if we remove our own subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then all constitution, all relations of objects in space and time, indeed space and time themselves would disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being.”

Synthetic a priori knowledge has the property that it is integral to how we see the world. It is subjective, in the sense that Kant explains above (that is, if we were to remove the subject, then it would also disappear), but it is also universal, in the sense that it applies to “every human being”.

Response:

I concur that the laws of logic are possessed by man a priori (man is made in the image of God and God’s mind isn’t blank); however, despite this correct statement, Malpass’s account for logic falls short. The definition of synthetic and the identification of synthetic truths require that the person believe propositions about the world. Given the laws of logic and the rules of inference, how can a person get from a priori propositions such as the laws of logic and validly draw an inference via a non-propositional source such as sensation so that he may draw a conclusion (which would be a proposition)? There is no such rule of inference that allows such an inference to be valid. Neither Malpass nor Kant can ignore logic while trying to account for it. He attempts to show, as Kant attempted to do, that a world without the laws of logic would be absurd, and therefore, they must be true, but the argument assumes, without basis, that non-propositional sources such as experience and sensation can give knowledge. Furthermore, it assumes that a propositional conclusion may be validly drawn from a non-proposition which stands at odds with logic. Last but not least, at best, Kant’s philosophy, even if it could get that far, only gives us a perception of the world. For all Malpass and Kant knows, the world could be very different from how they perceive it. If Malpass thinks none of this is problematic, it would be interesting to learn his definitions for ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth.’

He then goes on to attack Van Tillian presuppositionalism’s hypocrisy (which has nothing to do with Clarkian presuppositionalism). Since I am a Clarkian, I will let Van Tillians deal with him on that matter. Since he thinks the critique is relevant, it is obvious that he doesn’t understand the difference between Clarkian and Van Tilian apologetics. It’s hard to understand why Malpass would keep interacting with Clark’s ideas without knowing anything about them.

Malpass then gives a 3rd attempt to account for logic, but he qualifies it with saying that he doesn’t agree with that particular account (then why bring it up?).  Therefore, I will not thoroughly address it. I will say that he laid out the following argument:

“1. We are justified to believe in all the entities that are indispensable to our best scientific theories.
2.  Laws of logic are indispensable to our best scientific theories.
3. Therefore, we are justified to believe in the laws of logic.”

He claims that this argument can be used because Shaughnessy would agree with premise 2. No Clarkian would agree that premise 2 gives any justification to the laws of logic because scientific theories do not demonstrate the truth of any proposition. No Clarkian believes that science is a truth-finding method. This goes to show, yet again, that Malpass hasn’t read Clark, and by consequence, he doesn’t understand Clarkian presuppositionalism.

As I told Malpass in my debate with him, he needs to read Clark before attempting to criticize Clarkian presuppositionalism. This is about the 3rd time I have said it. I am guessing that he is too lazy to do his due diligence prior to criticizing another philosophy.

Conclusion

Malpass:

So, above are three distinct views about the epistemological foundations of logic. None of them required God, or Jesus, or Reformed theology at all. No doubt, they will continue, over at BibleThumpingWingnut.com, to claim that “The challenge has been made many times to unbelievers to account for logic in their own worldview and it has always fallen short or gone unanswered. Never has an adequate response been given“. In reality though, for those of us who have spent a long time doing philosophy seriously, these claims are easily countered. I’m not saying I have all the answers; I’m saying that they don’t. I don’t know what the ‘right answer’ is about the nature of logic, or how epistemology and logic fit together. It is an incredibly complicated area. As with philosophy, it may be something we will ultimately never answer. It may be that for some reason the question itself doesn’t make sense, but that this realisation doesn’t come for many generations yet. Maybe the answer was given in some obscure scroll, now long forgotten by history.

Response:

Malpass is saying that although he gave three accounts for logic, he doesn’t know that any one of them are successful. When Shaugnessy stated, “The challenge has been made many times to unbelievers to account for logic in their own worldview and it has always fallen short or gone unanswered. Never has an adequate response been given,“ he was referring to atheists not being able to account for logic. Malpass, by admitting ignorance concerning the issue, has just conceded that the very quote he is disputing is correct. I would be surprised, but we are talking about someone who attempted to account for logic by contradicting its rules. 

Footnotes:

1. To see his article, ‘Thoughts on Jason Petersen’s ‘Argument,’ see: https://useofreason.wordpress.com/2016/01/14/thoughts-on-jason-petersens-argument/

2. To see his article, The Problem with TAG, see: https://useofreason.wordpress.com/2015/11/07/the-problem-with-tag/

 

Filed Under: Addressing Critics, Articles, Defending the Faith Tagged With: Alex Malpass, Defending Clarkian Apologetics

A Response to Dr. Alex Malpass on the Axiom of Revelation and 1 John 2

December 3, 2017 by Jason Petersen Leave a Comment

Introduction

Recently, I debated Dr. Alex Malpass on the Bible Thumping Wingnut show. Overall, I feel that the debate went very well for me, but I do not think that it went well for Dr. Malpass. To be fair, Dr. Malpass did have quite a few drinks prior to debating me, and the debate itself was not planned. Tim Hurd (the host of the show) asked me to argue for a contention that is very specific. The contention was, if Christianity is true, logic (the science of necessary inference) can be accounted for. The reason why I am writing this blog post is because a friend brought a blog post, Thoughts on Jason Petersen’s ‘Argument’,  to my attention. 1 This blog post will be commenting on what was said in his blog post.

Dr. Malpass:

At the end of my time on the BibleThumpingWingnut, after a few hours (and about 4 whiskeys, at about 3AM), Tim introduced a new person into the discussion to ‘engage’ with me for a bit. This was Jason Petersen, who advocates a version of Clarkian presuppositionalism.

My response:

In the debate, I had strong words for Dr. Malpass when he attempted to articulate the Clarkian apologetic. His articulation was not at all correct, and when I asked him if he had read Dr. Gordon Clark’s works, he said that he hadn’t. I rebuked him for being so careless in his criticisms. How can one criticize someone whom he has not read? It seems that either Dr. Malpass is a fast reader, or he has still not learned his lesson. What does he mean by a ‘version’ of Clarkian presuppositionalism? What other version is there? There is only one version.

Dr. Malpass:

Jason began by laying out an axiomatic demonstration of how you can go from the principle that the bible is the word of god to the conclusion that you can account for the laws of logic.

My response:

For the sake of context, I will give an account of what happened. I was asked by Tim to argue that if Christianity is true, one can give an account for logic. In my argument, logic is defined as the science of necessary inference. 2 I started with the axiom, “The Bible Alone is the Word of God written,” and argued that from this axiom, the Christian can give an account for logic. I began by pointing to 1 John 2:21, “I write to you, not because you do not know the truth, but because you know it, and because no lie is of the truth.” The proposition, “no lie is of the truth” is an affirmation of the law of contradiction. At that point, Dr. Malpass kept the conversation from going any further by invoking a definition of ‘lie’ that is different from the definition used in 1 John 2:21. Because we did not agree on the definition of ‘lie’ that was being utilized in 1 John 2:21, the discussion did not move forward.

Dr. Malpass:

After he explained his ‘axiom of revelation’, which is that the bible is true, he moved to a passage which contains the phrase ‘no lie is of the truth’. We got a bit stuck on this, as I objected that lies can be inadvertently true, as for example when someone intends to deceive, says something they believe is false, but which happens to be correct. I think that this would still count as a lie, but Jason disagreed, urging that we should use the biblical definition instead. I was tired and a bit drunk, so I may have missed what was going on at the time. I thought I should get a more sober reflection down here instead.

My response:

And here is the hang up. Dr. Malpass attempted to invoke a different definition of ‘lie’ than what was used in 1 John 2:21. He did this by inserting a fallibilist constraint on the lie that is referred to in 1 John 2 whereas in this particular reference to ‘lie,’ which is made by the apostle John, there is clearly no room for fallibility on the part of the person (antichrist) that is telling the lie. If the definition of ‘lie’ is changed and then used in 1 John 2:21, the proposition in 1 John 2:21 now has a different meaning. It is not proper to represent something, be it a person, proposition, or philosophical system by changing the definitions of the terms that the opposing position is using. Doing so would result in a misrepresentation, in this case, of 1 John 2:21.

In order to show what was meant by ‘lie.’ I briefly, despite the protesting of Dr. Malpass, gave an exposition of 1 John 2. I will reiterate some of the points made one more time. Starting at verse 18 of 1 John 2, the apostle John is warning Christians about the antichrists. 3 These antichrists are liars. However, the Christians have knowledge. They know the Gospel, and they know what Jesus taught. And because they know these things, they know that none of the antichrist’s lies are true. The Greek word for ‘truth’ that is used in v 21 is ‘alétheia.’ This particular word refers to the divine. Simply put, the word is used for an infallible truth. The Greek word that is used for ‘lie’ is ‘pseudos.’ The literal translation of this word is ‘falsehood’, but it can also be translated as ‘lie.’ When this term is invoked, it refers to either a falsehood or a spoken falsehood (lie). Now that the terms are defined, we will finish the point that is being made. If the truth referred to in 1 John 2:21, is an infallible truth, then the lie that is told must be false.

Now, we should contrast this with his objection. He objects that someone could think they are lying but inadvertently tell the truth. Clearly, this is not how the Bible describes the antichrists. These antichrists are deceivers. They are antagonistic to Christianity (Matthew 7:15). Therefore, the definition of ‘lie’ that Dr. Malpass invokes is not the same as definition that is invoked in 1 John 2:21. If Dr. Malpass wishes to offer a criticism of the Bible, he must use the definitions that are invoked in the passage in question. If I were teaching and I had a student that attempted to critique a position by changing the definition of words in a way that changes the meaning of what the opposition is articulating, I’d give him an ‘F’ without a second thought. Surely, if I were debating someone about evolution, and I invoked a different definition of evolution in order to more easily critique evolution, evolution supporters would jump all over it.

I will also say in passing that Dr. Malpass misrepresented my objection. I did not argue that people cannot intend to lie whilst being unaware that they are telling the truth. What I argued is that the word ‘lie’ is not used in this sense in 1 John 2:21. I urged Dr. Malpass to use the Bible’s definition because Dr. Malpass asserted that the statement, ‘no lie of the truth’ that is found in 1 John 2:21 is false. If Dr. Malpass is asserting that a proposition in the Bible is false, he must represent that proposition accurately or else he is arguing against another proposition all together (via a strawman fallacy). Because Dr. Malpass is critiquing the Bible, he must use its definitions when referencing the propositions in question. This is the proper way to interact with opposing positions, and Dr. Malpass, as someone who has a Ph.D in philosophy, should be well aware of this. How else could he had obtained his Ph.D in philosophy without representing other philosophers according to the way they define their own terms? Unless, of course, the instructors were incompetent, but from what I understand, the University of Bristol is in good repute.  I hope that this mistake was simply a result of Dr. Malpass drinking too much whiskey.

Dr. Malpass:

As I understand what was going on, Jason was starting with his axiom, and then deriving things from that, part of which included the law of non-contradiction. His point was (I believe), that ‘no lies are of the truth’ is an instance of someone stating the law of non-contradiction, i.e. ~(p & ~p). I think this is an exegetical stretch, and even if interpreted as generously as possible it gives a different law, the semantic principle of bivalence. So I say that ‘no lies are of the truth’ means ‘all lies are false’, which I said was false, due to my understanding of what lying means.

My response:

Dr. Malpass, once again, inserts a fallibist constraint on the word ‘lie’ that is invoked in 1 John 2:21. The proper understanding of its usage has already been shown, but Dr. Malpass has made an additional error that warrants attention. Dr. Malpass erroneously, and without warrant, assumes that just because he understands what ‘lying’ means in a certain way, that the apostle John, who lived thousands of years before him, would have understood it the same way when he penned 1 John 2. As anyone who is familiar with the English language is aware, the same word can have multiple definitions and can also be used in a different sense. In fact, it is not uncommon for a word in the English language to have four definitions. Certainly, I would not deny that someone could tell what they think is a lie whilst being unaware that what they are saying is true, but for reasons already explained, there is no room given for such a circumstance in 1 John 2.  Dr. Malpass has interpreted the statement in 1 John 2:21 as ‘all lies are false’ because he is stuck in his own definition of the term ‘lie’ that is in question. But if one recognizes that the word ‘lie’ (and looks at the Greek meaning of the word that is used in 1 John 2) that is invoked in 1 John 2, it is in reference to a falsehood that stands in opposition to the infallible, universal, and eternal truth of the Gospel, the meaning of the passage is quite clear.  These lies that are told are falsehoods (as shown from the Greek), and none of these falsehoods are true. Therefore, we have, from 1 John 2:21, a distinction between what is false and what is true. From this passage, we also recognize that if there is a distinction between truth and falsehood, ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’ cannot be two terms that are synonymous in meaning, for if they were, what point would there be in making a distinction between these two terms? If the meaning of the terms were synonymous, there could be no distinction. Therefore, with this distinction between ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’, we have, from the scriptures, an affirmation of the law of contradiction.

Dr. Malpass:

But let’s assume that the intentional aspect of lying is not important, and as such lying just means saying a falsehood. This makes the sentence ‘no lies are of the truth’ analytically true (i.e. true by definition). Fair enough. It just means ‘no falsehood is true’. In other words, it means that if something is false, it is not also true. The principle of bivalence says that every proposition takes exactly one truth value: true or false; i.e. that if a sentence is true, it is not false, and vice versa. For some reason, Jason thinks that the sentence actually should be read as meaning ‘it is not the case that both p and not-p’; i.e. it is not the case that p and it is not-p. Notice that this doesn’t use the word truth at all. The difference may seem minor, but it allows that there can be logics where some proposition is neither true nor false (so no bivalence), but where it and its negation are still incompatible (so keeping non-contradiction), etc.

My response:

It is not a ‘sentence.’ ‘No lie is of the truth’ is a part the singular sentence that is found in verse 21. Dr. Malpass has either not looked at the sentence in verse 21 carefully enough or he is not careful enough about his wording, or perhaps I am being too picky.  My point was that the passage makes a distinction between a falsehood and the truth. Two mutually opposing propositions cannot be true in the same time and in the same sense. This is the law of contradiction. Just the same, the example given, “…that both P and not-P,” Dr. Malpass contends, does not even contain the word truth. Indeed it doesn’t, but Dr. Malpass confuses the form of the law of contradiction with its application concerning propositions external to itself. The definition of the law of contradiction is a proposition that is stated symbolically. It is simply, ‘P’and ‘not P’ cannot be true in the same time and/or sense. ‘P’ and ‘Not P’ are blanks to be filled when the law of contradiction is applied to propositions external to itself. Clearly, 1 John 2:21 says, “I write to you, not because you do not know the truth, but because you know it, and because no lie [not-p] is of the truth [p].” In other words, the lie (not p) is not the truth (p). Therefore, it is indeed an affirmation of the law of contradiction because the form of the law of contradiction is utilized in the proposition that is communicated.

Dr. Malpass:

Anyway, we can forgive the fact that a) the sentence is false (because I am right about what lying means), b) the sentence at best means something similar to the principle of bivalence, and c) it doesn’t mean the same as the principle of non-contradiction. We can forgive all of those and just assume that he was right. So let’s just say he starts from his revelational axiom, and then ‘derives’ the principle of non-contradiction. That seemed to be what he wanted to do. I say that this is horribly flawed anyway, despite the above.

Response:

In regards to the principle of bivalence, I have already demonstrated the law of contradiction from 1 John 2:21. 4 This means that the notion of the possibility of the law not being validated is of no concern. The law of contradiction can be found throughout scripture, even Genesis 1:1. If there is any necessary distinction between a true and false proposition (as would have to be the case for the propositions of scripture to be true), there is an account for the law of contradiction.  I chose 1 John 2:21 because it is among the most obvious of examples. In order for truth or knowledge of it to be possible, the law of contradiction must hold. The Westminster Confession of Faith states,  “The whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for His own glory, man’s salvation, faith and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture: unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit, or traditions of men.” 5

Dr. Malpass:

So he has an axiom: everything in the bible is true (he actually says ‘the bible alone is the word of God written’). This basically just means that every proposition in the bible is true. So think of the bible as a set of propositions, B = {a, b, c, …} and that every member of the set is true. Then he says that he can go to one of those propositions, which is the law of non-contradiction (although he repeatedly dropped the ‘non’ for some reason).

Therefore, the law of non-contradiction is true. In this way he derives it from his basic axiom.

So, assuming a = the principle of non-contradiction, the argument so far is:

Premise 1) a & b & c & … (i.e. all the elements of B)

Therefore, a

However, the inference from B to a (from all the things in the bible, to the one particular thing in the bible), relies on the inference rule called ‘conjunction elimination’; from p & q one can infer p:

Premise 1) p & q

Therefore, p

Therefore, Jason’s ‘axiom’ needs to be supplemented with, at least, the inference rules of classical logic, if he is to move off his axiomatic starting point to derive anything (even if it is contained as a conjunct in his conjunction). He doesn’t mention inference rules, but he must be assuming them or else he would be stuck with his axiom. So let’s be nice and give them to him. But that means he is assuming classical logic. And that means he is assuming the law of non-contradiction. So he doesn’t need to ‘derive’ the law of non-contradiction, as he would in fact be assuming it at the outset.

Response:

The law of contradiction can be referred to as either the law of contradiction or the law of non-contradiction. 6 I do not say ‘non-contradiction’ because I find the prefix ‘non’ to be superfluous when in reference to the law of contradiction because it adds nothing to the term in regard to its meaning.

That aside, how is it that Christians account for logical forms? Simply, if the logical forms are found in scripture, they are valid.  There are a few examples of this. Dr. Clark lists a few examples:

“On this basis-that is, on the basis that Scripture is the mind of God-the relation to logic can easily be made clear. As might be expected, if God has spoken, he has spoken logically. The Scripture therefore should and does exhibit logical organization. For example, Romans 4:2 is an enthymematic hypothetical destructive syllogism. Romans 5:13 is a hypothetical constructive syllogism. 1 Corinthians 15:15-18 is a sorites. Obviously, examples of standard logical forms such as these could be listed at great length.” 7

Frankly, the list of inferences that are made in scripture is quite comprehensive. In the same way, Christians can also account for mathematics. 8 If a logical form is found in the Bible, the Christian may consider it a valid inference, for it is God that is the source of logic (John 1:1). Because of this, we can account for the inferences made from the proposition, “The Bible Alone is the Word of God.” This is how the inference in question, conjunction elimination, is accounted for.

In order to show how easy it is to account for conjunction elimination, I will use the very passage in which Dr. Malpass and I argued about. In 1 John 2, verses 13 and 14 are propositions that we can use to account for conjunction elimination. In verse 13, though several proposition are stated, one in particular warrants our attention, “I am writing to you, young men, because you have overcome the evil one.” In verse 14, we have a string of propositions that are connected by the conjunction, ‘and,’ “I write to you, young men, because you are strong,  and the word of God abides in you, and you have overcome the evil one.” In this example, we have the same proposition in two different verses. First, in verse 13, and second, in verse 14. Verse 14 is connected to other propositions via a conjunction, whereas verse 13, though preceded by a subordinating conjunction, is a proposition that stands alone because it is a stated as a singular reason for why the apostle John is writing to these young men. Therefore, we have an example of conjunction elimination in 1 John 2:13-14. Examples of this inference in scripture are bountiful. So much, in fact, that we found an example in the very passage that is in dispute.

Dr. Malpas also objects by saying that the classical rules of inference must be assumed prior to the axiom of revelation, but let us not, as Dr. Malpass has done, confuse ‘assuming’ the rules of inference with ‘accounting for them.’ Certainly, not being able to account for an inference does not stop a person from utilizing a rule of inference. Though unbelievers do not accept the truth of the Bible, they can still use the rules of inference by simply assuming the rules of inference. This, however, does not amount to accounting for the rules of inference. Accounting for the rules of inference would involve validating the proper rules of inference. And the Bible is God breathed, and therefore, a product of God’s mind (2 Timothy 3:16). If the Bible is a product of God’s mind, then how can anyone deny that we have the wonderful opportunity to get a glimpse of how God thinks? If, when imparting the truth to His children, God utilizes a rule of inference, that inference may be considered valid because it it were not valid, the premises would not guarantee the truth of the conclusion that God reveals to us. And if the premises of the syllogism does not guarantee the conclusion, then the syllogism would be a lie, but God is not a liar (Titus 1:2). According to scripture, all things that God says is true must be true.

But if the proper inferences from an axiom is so important. One might ask, how is it that Dr. Malpass can account for these inferences? It has already been shown that Christianity is able to do so. 9 If one cannot account for inferences, as Dr. Malpass argues, one cannot infer, but he gives us nothing in regards to his own epistemology. And if one attempts to start with a logical form, there is no content to fill the form. Christianity does not succumb to the critiques given by Dr. Malpass, but one cannot help but wonder if he is able to answer his own objection in a way that would allow him to avoid epistemological skepticism.

In regards to whether Christians should start with the Bible or the law of contradiction, Dr. Clark also had something to say about this:

“Even in the single words themselves, as is most clearly seen in the cases of nouns and verbs, logic is embedded. If Scripture says, David was King of Israel, it does not mean that David was President of Babylon; and surely it does not mean that Churchill was Prime Minister of China. That is to say, the words David, King, and Israel have definite meanings. The old libel that Scripture is a wax nose and that interpretation is infinitely elastic is clearly wrong. If there were no limits to interpretation, we might interpret the libel itself as an acceptance of verbal and plenary inspiration. But since the libel cannot be so interpreted, neither can the Virgin Birth be interpreted as a myth nor the Resurrection as a symbol of spring. No doubt there are some things hard to be understood which the unlearned wrest to their own destruction, but the difficulties are no greater than those found in Aristotle or Plotinus, and against these philosophers no such libel is ever directed. Furthermore, only some things are hard. For the rest, Protestants have insisted on the perspicuity of Scripture.

Nor need we waste time repeating Aristotle’s explanation of ambiguous words. The fact that a word must mean one thing and not its contradictory is the evidence of the law of contradiction in all rational language. This exhibition of the logic embedded in Scripture explains why Scripture rather than the law of contradiction is selected as the axiom. Should we assume merely the law of contradiction, we would be no better off than Kant was. His notion that knowledge requires a priori categories deserves great respect. Once for all, in a positive way-the complement of Hume’s negative and unintentional way-Kant demonstrated the necessity of axioms, presuppositions, or a priori equipment. But this sine qua non is not sufficient to produce knowledge. Therefore the law of contradiction as such and by itself is not made the axiom of this argument. 10“

Dr. Malpass:

But maybe he has in mind a sort of non-classical logic, one that retains the ability to use conjunction elimination, but does not postulate as an axiom that there are no contradictions. But then the problem would be that there would be nothing to stop the paradoxical looking inference rule: ‘negation introduction’, which I have just made up, but would look like this:

Premise 1) p

Therefore ~p

Presumably, Jason would want to object that this rule is not part of his implicit set of inference rules. But the question would then be, why not? It seems to me that the only thing Jason could appeal to would be the fact that there cannot be a contradiction, which just is the principle of non-contradiction. And if he said that he would be admitting that he does presuppose non-contradiction after all, and does not derive it from an axiom.

The results for his logic if he did have negation introduction would be devastating. For a start, from his axiom B, one could derive ~B; from the axiom that the bible is true, one could derive that it is not the case that the bible is true. Even if he derived a from B (the principle of non-contradiction from the bible), one could also derive ~a from B (by deriving a from B, and ~a from a). So the bible would say there could be no contradictions, and it would say that it is not the case that there could be no contradictions.

The point is that negation elimination is to be avoided at all costs. The best way to avoid it is to start with it as an axiom that there are no true contradictions.

Response:

That’s a negative. My philosophy does not involve non-classical logic. Therefore, anything said concerning non-classical logic is not relevant to my position. However, such a polemic would be self defeating. If the truth of P necessarily leads to the truth of ~P, the law of contradiction is false. If the law of contradiction is false, there is no distinction between P and ~P, if there is no distinction between both propositions of the non-classical variety, therefore, this critique by Dr. Malpass would be meaningless because the non-classical framework of the critique he gave would involve the rejection of the law of contradiction. One cannot use the law of contradiction to argue that a proposition is false if the one who invokes the law of contradiction accepts a framework that denies the law of contradiction.

Conclusion

Dr. Malpass’ objections have been answered. Let us hope that these answers will encourage him to do a bit more research before attacking a position that he is unfamiliar with. As someone who has a Ph.D in philosophy, he should know better. This is a mistake that he has already made twice. Let us hope he does not make that mistake a third time.

Footnotes:

1. https://useofreason.wordpress.com/2016/01/14/thoughts-on-jason-petersens-argument/

2. Dr. Malpass incorrectly objected to this definition because he did not realize that in order to say that an inference is valid, it MUST be necessary.

3.  An antichrist is a person that attempts fool others into think that he is a Christian, but is antagonistic to Christianity.

4. The principle of bivalence holds that a that a proposition only has one truth value (it is either true or false).  This principle is not to be confused with the law of excluded middle.

5. The Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter I, Article VI; 2TI 3:15, GAL 1:8, 2TH 2:2.

6. https://www.britannica.com/topic/laws-of-thought#ref180925

7. https://www.trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=16

8. https://www.trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=55

9. All statements that have truth value in scripture are propositions.

10. https://www.trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=16

Filed Under: Addressing Critics, Articles, Defending the Faith Tagged With: Alex Malpass, Defending Clarkian Apologetics

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